handler/README.md

# handler

A remote control wrapper for [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) agents.
Run many `claude` agents across many projects — each isolated, each leaving behind a
**checkmark** (its current state) and an entry in a **big log** (the complete history) —
all backed by a centralized database, driven entirely through an HTTP API.

Every agent process is a real `claude` binary invocation. There is no hard dependency on
any particular git host or network layer: you bring your own Claude Code login, your own
git remote, and your own network exposure.

> **Status: Phase 2 (forge integration) implemented on top of the Phase 1 MVP.** The
> control layer, HTTP API, database, migrations, and verification/approval hooks are
> implemented and tested (106 tests, SQLite). Phase 2 adds credential resolution +
> injection, role-based forge-workflow skills, a hard approval gate, and a CI-status
> poller. Agent runs are headless (`claude -p --output-format stream-json`, supervised
> by the worker, events persisted to the DB); the run/kill/resume paths are exercised
> end-to-end against a scripted fake claude binary, with a manual validation script
> (`scripts/validate_claude_headless.sh`) for the real one. See
> [`docs/PLAN.md`](docs/PLAN.md) for the full design and roadmap.

---

## Why

One operator running several of their own projects wants to fan work out to background
Claude Code agents and keep a reliable, queryable picture of what each one is doing —
without babysitting a wall of tmux panes. `handler` gives every agent:

- **A checkmark** — one small, always-current row: where it stopped, what's next, any
  open question for you. Overwritten on every checkpoint, like a file you keep saving.
- **A big log** — the append-only history of everything every agent has ever done.
- **A verification gate** — an agent never reaches `done` on its own say-so. A `Stop`
  hook runs the project's own test task and blocks the turn on failure, so `done` in the
  database means *a test run passed*.
- **A push gate** — a `git push` doesn't leave until tests pass *and* a throwaway image
  build succeeds locally, so a push already known to fail CI never goes out.
- **Isolation** — each project has its own working directory, agents, history, and
  credentials; nothing crosses the boundary unless you explicitly share it.

## Architecture

Three components over one database. The database is the only thing that holds state, so
the control layer and API are disposable compute that can restart or scale out freely.

```
        writes                                        reads (+ answer backfill)
  ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
  │  worker(s)       │───────▶│   database   │◀───────│    HTTP API      │
  │  (CLI + hooks)   │        │  PG / SQLite │        │  (FastAPI)       │
  └──────────────────┘        └──────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
     │        ▲                                              ▲
     │ spawns │ Stop / PreToolUse / Notification hooks       │ curl, UI, any client
     ▼        │ + streamed run events, checkmark, log        │ (bearer token)
  claude -p --output-format stream-json (one working dir / worktree per agent)
```

- **Control layer / workers** (`handler.control`) — the only writer. Runs each agent as
  a **headless** `claude -p --output-format stream-json` subprocess (one working
  directory or git worktree per agent), streams every stdout event into the database as
  it happens, and reconciles agent status from the process itself (exit code + EOF —
  positive liveness, no screen scraping). Stateless: repo state is pulled from git when
  a task is claimed, claude session transcripts are archived to / materialized from the
  DB for cross-worker `--resume`, and the claude login credential bundle is distributed
  encrypted through the DB. tmux survives only to drive the interactive `/login` flow.
- **Hooks** (`handler.hooks`) — run inside each agent via a generated `settings.json`.
  They write the checkpoint/log rows and enforce the test and push gates.
- **API** (`handler.api`) — a thin, read-mostly HTTP layer over the same database (the
  one write it does is backfilling an operator's answer). Bearer-token auth on every
  route; every agent route is nested under `/projects/:project/` so nothing leaks across
  a project boundary.

### One schema, two backends

The data model is defined once (SQLAlchemy Core) and renders correctly on both:

- **Postgres** (default for real deployments) — `BIGSERIAL`, `TIMESTAMPTZ`, `JSONB`.
  A live central server is what makes the stateless-container story true.
- **SQLite** (minimal-infra fallback) — a single file, zero services. Same schema shape,
  simpler types (`INTEGER PRIMARY KEY`, TEXT, JSON).

Portable column types bridge the two, and the checkmark upsert uses native
`INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` on both dialects. Migrations are Alembic, dual-dialect.

### Scaling workers horizontally

Multiple worker containers can drain the same command queue concurrently (Postgres
`FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`); each supervises up to `MAX_CONCURRENT_RUNS` claude processes
and skips claiming run-starting commands while full, leaving them for a less-loaded
worker. Workers heartbeat into the DB; if one dies mid-run, any surviving worker's
reaper marks its runs (and their agents) `crashed` — visible in the UI with the last
output preserved — and the operator resumes explicitly on whichever worker picks it up.

Deployment invariants for multi-worker:

- **No shared filesystems.** Git carries repo state (workers clone/pull on claim);
  claude session transcripts live in `session_archives`; login credentials are
  Fernet-encrypted into `runtime_secrets` and materialized by every worker.
- **Identical `PROJECTS_ROOT` on every worker** — claude keys its session storage to
  the absolute working-dir path, so cross-worker `--resume` needs the same layout.
- **The same `HANDLER_SECRET_KEY` on every worker** (and the API) — without it, the
  credential bundle can't be distributed and only the worker that ran `/login` can run
  agents.
- The two-step web login is automatically pinned to one worker
  (`commands.target_worker`), so it works unchanged with a fleet.

## Requirements

- Python 3.11+
- `git` (for live spawning) and `tmux` (only for the web `/login` flow)
- A `claude` binary, authenticated (for live spawning)
- `mise` in each managed project, with a `.mise.toml` defining at least a `test` task
- Postgres (default) — or nothing but a file path for the SQLite fallback

## Install

```bash
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
```

## Configure

Configuration is entirely environment-driven (see [`.env.example`](.env.example)):

| Variable | Purpose | Default |
|---|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` | `sqlite:////abs/path.db` or `postgresql+psycopg://…` | `sqlite:///./handler.db` |
| `AUTH_TOKEN` | Legacy/machine bearer token (scripts, CI, break-glass) — humans sign in with email + password instead ([user accounts](#user-accounts--sign-in)) | unset → env-token auth off |
| `SHARED_CONTEXT_WRITE_TOKEN` | Higher-trust token gating `PUT /shared/context/:key` | falls back to `AUTH_TOKEN` |
| `ADMIN_TOKEN` | Admin-level env token (enqueue commands, project/host CRUD, credential edits) | falls back to `AUTH_TOKEN` |
| `SMTP_HOST` / `SMTP_PORT` / `SMTP_USERNAME` / `SMTP_PASSWORD` / `SMTP_FROM` / `SMTP_STARTTLS` / `SMTP_SSL` | Outbound email for invite + password-reset links | unset → links shown to the admin instead of mailed |
| `PUBLIC_BASE_URL` | Base URL emailed links point at | unset → the request's own origin |
| `SESSION_TTL_DAYS` / `RESET_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS` / `INVITE_TOKEN_TTL_HOURS` | Session and one-shot-link lifetimes | `30` / `2` / `168` |
| `WEBHOOK_URL` | Generic target for the `Notification` hook (ntfy, Slack, …) | unset → no-op |
| `SEARXNG_URL` / `BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY` | Provider for the agents' `web_search` tool (pi harness) | unset → DuckDuckGo fallback |
| `HANDLER_SECRET_KEY` | Fernet key encrypting git-server tokens + SSH keys at rest (set the same value on API and control) | unset → secret store disabled |
| `PROJECTS_ROOT` | Base dir for per-project roots / worktrees / auto-clones | `./projects` |
| `CLAUDE_BIN` / `PI_BIN` / `MISE_BIN` / `TMUX_BIN` / `FORGE_BIN` / `GIT_BIN` | Binary overrides | `claude` / `pi` / `mise` / `tmux` / `forge` / `git` |
| `FORGE_VERSION` | Pinned forge version verified at spawn (Phase 2) | unset → skip check |
| `PROTECTED_BRANCHES` | Branches a direct push needs an approval to reach (Phase 2) | `main,master` |

## Run

Apply migrations, then start the API:

```bash
export DATABASE_URL="sqlite:///$PWD/handler.db"
export AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"

alembic upgrade head
uvicorn handler.api.app:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
```

The API is just a client contract — everything below works with plain `curl`:

```bash
TOKEN="Authorization: Bearer $AUTH_TOKEN"
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:8000"

# Register a project and an agent
curl -s -X POST $BASE/projects -H "$TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"id":"leeworks-api","root_dir":"/srv/projects/leeworks"}'

curl -s -X POST $BASE/projects/leeworks-api/agents -H "$TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"api","working_dir":"/srv/projects/leeworks/api"}'

# Read an agent's checkmark and log
curl -s $BASE/projects/leeworks-api/agents/api/checkmark -H "$TOKEN"
curl -s $BASE/projects/leeworks-api/agents/api/log -H "$TOKEN"

# Answer a paused question, then resume the agent
curl -s -X POST $BASE/projects/leeworks-api/agents/api/answer -H "$TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"answer":"use Postgres"}'
curl -s -X POST $BASE/projects/leeworks-api/agents/api/resume -H "$TOKEN" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}'
```

## Containers

Two images are published to GHCR, one per process, sharing the package, the database, and
the `/var/lib/handler` data volume:

| Image | Dockerfile | Runs | Workflow |
|---|---|---|---|
| `ghcr.io/0xwheatyz/handler` | [`Dockerfile`](Dockerfile) | the API (`uvicorn`) — also applies migrations on start | [`docker.yml`](.github/workflows/docker.yml) |
| `ghcr.io/0xwheatyz/handler/control` | [`Dockerfile.control`](Dockerfile.control) | the control worker (`handler worker`) | [`docker-control.yml`](.github/workflows/docker-control.yml) |

The control image bakes in **every executable the control layer shells out to** — `git`,
`tmux`, `openssh-client`, `node` + the `claude` CLI, `mise`, and `forge` — so live agent
spawning, the verification gate, CI resolution, and the [web login](#claude-login-from-the-web-ui)
flow all work with zero bring-your-own binaries. The **worker** drains the control-command queue the API
enqueues (spawn/kill/resume/approve/reject/forge-init/poll-ci) and sweeps CI on an interval
(subsuming `poll-ci --watch`), so the whole system is drivable from the dashboard — see
[Web management](#web-management).

[`docker-compose.yml`](docker-compose.yml) wires both up with Postgres. The API owns
migrations, so the control service runs with `RUN_MIGRATIONS=false` and waits for the API:

```bash
export AUTH_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
export ADMIN_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"   # unlocks management actions in the dashboard
docker compose up -d                           # db + api + control (worker)

# One-shot control commands run against the same image:
docker compose run --rm control handler list
docker compose run --rm control handler spawn --project leeworks-api --name junior --task "…"
```

## User accounts & sign-in

Humans no longer need to know an API key. The dashboard signs in with **email +
password**, and the accounts model is deliberately small-team-shaped:

- **First run**: with zero accounts, the sign-in page becomes a setup form. The first
  account created **is the admin**. (`POST /auth/setup` refuses once any account exists.)
- **Everyone else is invited by an admin** (Users page / `POST /auth/users`): creating a
  user mints a one-shot **invite link** through which the invitee sets their own
  password. With SMTP configured the link is emailed; either way it is shown to the
  admin, so email is optional infrastructure, not a requirement.
- **Password reset by email**: "Forgot password?" mails a short-lived reset link
  (`POST /auth/forgot` — silent about whether the address exists). Without SMTP, an
  admin mints a reset link from the Users page instead. Spending a link revokes every
  existing session for that account.
- **Sessions** are opaque bearer tokens (only their SHA-256 is stored), sent exactly
  like the old token: `Authorization: Bearer …`. `POST /auth/logout` revokes one;
  changing a password revokes the rest.
- **Admin safety rails**: the last active admin can't be demoted, disabled, or deleted;
  you can't delete your own account.

### Per-user separation

Every project, skill, MCP connector, plugin, and model backend is either **owned** by
one user or **shared** (no owner). The rules, everywhere:

- A user sees **shared + their own** — another user's resources don't exist for them
  (listings filter, direct lookups 404, so existence isn't leaked).
- Creating a resource makes you its owner; owners manage their own resources without
  admin help (spawn/kill agents, schedules, approvals, sync, memory notes — everything
  project-nested follows the project's owner).
- **Shared resources are admin-managed** and behave exactly like the pre-accounts world:
  visible to all, editable by admins. Legacy rows all land here on upgrade, so nothing
  changes until people start owning things.
- At **launch**, an agent gets only what its project's owner can see: their skills +
  connectors + the shared set. One user's tools never reach another user's agents, and
  a private model backend can't be selected for someone else's spawn or schedule.
- Deleting a user **reassigns their resources to shared** (never orphans or deletes
  work); an admin can also reassign a project's owner explicitly (`PATCH /projects/:p`).
- Global infrastructure stays admin-only: git servers, the Claude account login,
  permission overrides, global memory notes, and user management itself.

### Legacy env tokens

`AUTH_TOKEN` / `ADMIN_TOKEN` / `SHARED_CONTEXT_WRITE_TOKEN` keep working with their
historical semantics (see-everything machine credentials; the admin token passes admin
gates). They're the right tool for scripts and CI — and the break-glass if every admin
is locked out. Resources they create are shared. The dashboard's sign-in page keeps a
"Use an API token" fallback for token-only deployments.

## Web management

The dashboard (and the API under it) manages everything — git credentials & hosts,
projects, agents, and approvals — without dropping to the CLI. Because the API and control
layer are **separate containers** (the API has no `git`/`tmux`/`claude` and doesn't own the
tmux sessions), the API can't run control actions directly. Instead it **enqueues a command**
and the worker in the control container executes it and writes the result back:

```
 Dashboard ──HTTP──▶ API (read + enqueue)              Control container
                        │  writes a `commands` row         │  worker: claim → dispatch → result
                        ▼                                   ▼
                     ┌─────────────── shared database ───────────────┐
                     │ projects  agents  approvals  commands  hosts  │
                     └────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

What the dashboard can now do (all state-changing actions require `ADMIN_TOKEN`):

- **Git servers** — one entry per forge host, and the server **owns its credentials**:
  - a **forge token**, submitted once and stored **encrypted** (`HANDLER_SECRET_KEY`,
    Fernet) — the API never returns it, only a `has_token` flag. Every project on that
    server uses it automatically (for both `forge` and git-over-HTTPS), no per-repo setup.
  - an **SSH deploy key** (ed25519), generated server-side; the **public key is shown in
    the dashboard** to paste into GitHub/Gitea/… as a deploy or account key. The private
    key is encrypted at rest and only ever materialized (0600) in the control container.
- **Projects** — add a repo by picking a **configured git server** and typing
  **`owner/name`** — that's the whole form. Handler derives the remote (ssh when the
  server has a deploy key, https via the stored token otherwise), computes `root_dir`
  under `PROJECTS_ROOT` (stateless workflows don't care where the clone lives), and
  enqueues a `sync` command so the worker clones it. Manual mode (existing `root_dir`)
  still works; every project with a remote gets a **Pull now** button, and spawn always
  pulls first.
- **Schedules** — recurring agent spawns: a name prefix, a prompt, an interval, and
  optionally a **model backend** (the same dropdown the spawn form has — every fired run
  spawns on it). The
  worker fires each due schedule as a normal queued `spawn` with a timestamped agent name
  (`nightly-20260710-090000`), so runs are fresh, stateless agents and show up in
  Activity. The canonical prompt keeps its state in the repo: *"Read @notes.md, continue
  from there; before finishing, overwrite that file."*
- **Agents** — spawn (name, role, worktree/subdir, task) and kill via the queue; delete the
  row; plus the existing checkmark / log / answer-resume views.
- **Approvals** — record an operator verdict per branch (approve/reject); the deploy gate
  treats an operator verdict as a genuine second party (no self-approval).
- **Credentials** — a project's `credential_ref` **pointer** still overrides everything.
  Web-settable schemes are `env:` / `file:` / `db:host:<hostname>` (the `cmd:` scheme is
  CLI-only, since it would run an arbitrary command in the control container).
  `db:host:<hostname>` reads the named git server's encrypted stored token.
- **Activity** — every enqueued command with its status (queued → running → done/failed) —
  the audit log of what the dashboard triggered. The UI polls `GET /commands/{id}` for
  live status.
- **Claude** — the management page for the Claude Code install agents run on. The account
  login lives here (see below), plus web-managed **model backends**, **skills**,
  **MCP connectors**, **plugins**, and **permission overrides**. Model backends are
  alternative endpoints offered in the spawn form's **Model** dropdown next to the
  Claude subscription, and each picks a **harness**: `claude` (the same `claude` binary
  pointed at an Anthropic-API-compatible endpoint — a local model behind LiteLLM or
  claude-code-router, an LLM gateway — via `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`/`ANTHROPIC_MODEL` env at
  launch) or `pi` (the lightweight [pi coding agent](https://github.com/badlogic/pi-mono),
  which speaks bare OpenAI-compatible endpoints — vLLM, llama.cpp, Ollama — natively, no
  translation proxy, with handler's hooks/gates/memory/skills bridged in via a bundled pi
  extension). Either way hooks, skills, and gates apply, and the agent stays pinned to
  its backend across resumes. API keys are stored encrypted (`HANDLER_SECRET_KEY`) and
  never returned. See [`docs/local-models.md`](docs/local-models.md) for working local
  stacks (and why bare OpenAI-compatible servers break tool calling *on the claude
  harness*). These are plain DB rows the control container
  applies at every launch: skills sync to each worker's user-level `~/.claude/skills`
  (marker-file managed, so hand-installed skills survive), enabled connectors become the
  run's `--mcp-config` file (nothing lands in the repo tree), and plugins/permissions fold
  into the generated per-agent `settings.json` — so a change in the UI reaches the next
  launch of every agent, no redeploy. Skills can also be **installed from a marketplace
  prompt** (SkillsMP and friends): paste the page's install prompt and a `skill_install`
  command runs it through a one-off headless claude in a staging dir on the worker, then
  imports whatever `<skill>/SKILL.md` (+ auxiliary files) landed as managed rows.
  Headless means nobody can answer questions mid-install, so the wrapped prompt makes the
  choices a human would be asked — always user scope, the instructions' defaults — and
  reports them in the command result for after-the-fact review.
- **Built-in operator skills** ship with Handler and are seeded into the managed store
  on API startup (`handler.builtin_skills`): quiet output (tool calls + a minimized
  `NOTES.md` ledger instead of transcript prose), gate recovery, testing standard,
  checkpoint quality, memory discipline, mise-task rules, scheduled-run continuity,
  and secrets hygiene — the judgment layer the hard gates can't enforce. Seeding is
  idempotent by name, so operator edits and disables survive upgrades; deleting one
  brings it back as shipped on the next start (disable is the off-switch).

The command queue is exposed over HTTP as `POST …/agents/spawn`, `POST …/agents/{n}/kill`,
`POST …/approvals`, `POST …/forge-init`, `POST …/poll-ci`, `POST …/sync`,
`POST /login/start`, `POST /login/submit`, and `GET /commands[/{id}]`; hosts as `/hosts`;
schedules as `/schedules` + `/projects/{id}/schedules`; project mutation as
`PATCH`/`DELETE /projects/{id}`; Claude management as `/claude/models`, `/claude/skills`,
`/claude/connectors`, `/claude/plugins` (CRUD), and `GET`/`PUT /claude/permissions`
(reads with the normal token, writes admin-gated). Run the worker with `handler worker`
(the control image's default command).

### Claude login from the web UI

Agents *are* `claude` processes, so the control container needs a logged-in Claude Code.
Because that container has no interactive shell in normal operation, the **Claude** page's
Account tab logs it in from the browser — the same command-queue handoff every other
control action uses:

1. **Log in to Claude** enqueues a `login_start` command. The worker opens `claude` in a
   dedicated (wide) tmux session in the control container, navigates whatever onboarding a
   fresh `claude` shows (theme picker, folder-trust) to the **Claude account with
   subscription** login, and scrapes the pane for the `claude.com` authorization URL —
   returned in the command result.
2. The UI opens that URL in a small **OAuth-style popup window** (like "Sign in with …";
   claude.com refuses to be embedded in an iframe, so a popup is the right surface), with
   a new-tab link as a fallback. You authorize there and Claude gives you a code.
3. **Finish login** enqueues a `login_submit` command carrying the code; the worker pastes
   it into the still-open session and presses Enter separately (a long code plus an
   immediate Enter races the TUI and never submits), then confirms by watching claude write
   its credentials.

The login session lives in the control container, and Claude's credentials land under the
`handler` user's home on the `/var/lib/handler` volume — so the login **persists** across
restarts and is shared by every agent the worker spawns. The flow is admin-gated
(`ADMIN_TOKEN`) and driven entirely through `POST /login/start` and `POST /login/submit`.
The interactive claude TUI is timing-sensitive; the waits in `control.login` are generous
and overridable if a slow host needs more.

## Control CLI

The `handler` command manages agent processes directly (an alternative to the queue, for
operators at a shell):

```bash
handler spawn  --project leeworks-api --name junior --role junior --worktree feat/auth --task "add login"
#              [--model qwen3-coder]  # run on a registered model backend (Claude page → Models)
handler list   [--project leeworks-api]
handler attach --project leeworks-api --name junior
handler kill   --project leeworks-api --name junior
handler sync   --project leeworks-api               # clone or fast-forward the repo now

# Phase 2 — forge workflow
handler forge-init --project leeworks-api          # write + commit the role skills
handler approve --branch feat/auth --pr 12          # senior agent records its verdict
handler reject  --branch feat/auth --note "fix X"   # (project/agent from env in-session)
handler poll-ci [--project leeworks-api] [--watch]  # backfill CI verdicts
```

`spawn` refuses any project whose working directory has no `.mise.toml` with a
`[tasks.test]` task — the verification gate is a hard requirement, not a convention — and
it also refuses to start if the project's `credential_ref` is configured but can't be
resolved, so a broken secret pointer fails fast instead of leaving an orphaned agent. It
resolves the working directory (a subdirectory or a fresh git worktree, always under the
project root), writes a per-agent `.claude/settings.json` wiring the hooks, resolves and
injects the project's credentials (see below), and launches a `tmux` session with the
agent's identity and `DATABASE_URL` injected into its environment. `--role`
(`junior`/`senior`/`deploy`) records which forge-workflow role the agent plays.

## API reference

All routes require `Authorization: Bearer <token>` — a user session token from
`POST /auth/login` or a legacy env token. `GET /health`, `GET /auth/status`, and the
account bootstrap routes (`setup`/`login`/`forgot`/`reset`) are unauthenticated.

| Method & path | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `GET /auth/status` | `{initialized, smtp_configured}` — drives the setup-vs-signin page |
| `POST /auth/setup` | Create the first account (becomes the admin) |
| `POST /auth/login` · `POST /auth/logout` | Session lifecycle (opaque bearer, hash-stored) |
| `GET /auth/me` · `POST /auth/change-password` | Who am I / rotate my password |
| `POST /auth/forgot` · `POST /auth/reset` | Email reset link / spend a reset or invite link |
| `GET`/`POST /auth/users` · `PATCH`/`DELETE /auth/users/:id` | Admin user management (invite links) |
| `POST /auth/users/:id/reset-link` | Admin-minted reset/invite link (the no-SMTP path) |
| `GET /projects` · `POST /projects` | List / register projects |
| `GET /projects/:p/agents` · `POST …` | List / register agents (project-scoped) |
| `GET /projects/:p/agents/:name/checkmark` | The agent's current-state checkmark |
| `GET /projects/:p/agents/:name/log` | The agent's log history (paginated) |
| `POST /projects/:p/agents/:name/answer` | Backfill the operator's answer to an open question |
| `POST /projects/:p/agents/:name/resume` | Feed the answer back via `claude --resume` |
| `GET /hosts` · `POST /hosts` · `PATCH`/`DELETE /hosts/:h` | Git servers (token stored encrypted; `ssh_public_key` returned) |
| `GET /schedules` · `GET`/`POST /projects/:p/schedules` | Recurring agent spawns |
| `PATCH`/`DELETE /schedules/:id` | Edit / pause / remove a schedule |
| `POST /projects/:p/sync` | Clone-or-pull the project's repo (enqueued) |
| `GET /shared/log` | Cross-project feed of entries explicitly marked `global` |
| `GET /shared/context` · `GET /shared/context/:key` | Read shared key/value facts |
| `PUT /shared/context/:key` | Write a shared fact — requires the shared-write token |
| `GET /memory/notes` · `GET /memory/notes/:id` | Memory notes (`?project_id=` scopes, `?q=` searches) |
| `GET /memory/graph` | The whole note graph (notes + links) in one read |
| `POST`/`PATCH`/`DELETE /memory/notes…` · `POST`/`DELETE /memory/links…` | Author notes/links — requires the admin token |

## Agent memory

The distilled, linked knowledge layer over the raw log/transcript history: **notes**
(facts, decisions, gotchas, runbooks) scoped to a project or global, connected by
**links** into a graph the dashboard's Memory page draws. Every launch gets the bundled
`handler-memory` MCP server (injected into `--mcp-config` as
`python -m handler.mcpserver`, no operator setup), exposing `memory_search`,
`memory_get`, `memory_save`, and `memory_link`; a `SessionStart` hook injects the most
recent notes in scope, so knowledge from earlier runs arrives without being asked.
Notes live only in the database — like everything else, they survive disposable
workers by construction — and deleting an agent never deletes what it learned.

## Hooks

Wired into each agent as `python -m handler.hooks <event>`:

- **`Stop` / `SessionEnd`** — checkpoint + completion gate. On `Stop`, run
  `mise run test` and check the tree deterministically: failing tests, uncommitted
  changes, or commits that exist only locally each return `decision: "block"` with the
  full blocker list, so a turn cannot end on red or walk away from unshipped work.
  Records `tests_status` / `tested_at`; `status = 'done'` only ever accompanies a
  passing gate (tests green, tree clean, everything pushed). The agent's final message
  is captured from the session transcript onto the checkmark, so the dashboard always
  shows a real checkpoint whether or not the agent thought to leave one.
- **`PreToolUse`** — two jobs. An `AskUserQuestion` is *deferred*: the question is
  persisted, the checkmark set to `paused_for_input`, and the tool call denied so control
  hands off to the async answer/resume flow. A `Bash` command running `git push` triggers
  the push gate — tests first, then a throwaway image build (`mise run build-image`) — and
  is denied on the first failure.
- **`Notification`** — POSTs a small JSON payload to `WEBHOOK_URL` (no-op when unset).
  Never blocks the agent on delivery failure.
- **`SessionStart`** — memory recall: injects the most recent memory notes in the
  agent's scope (its project + global) as additional context, plus a pointer at the
  handler-memory MCP tools. Best-effort; never blocks the session.

Hook identity travels via environment variables injected at spawn (`HANDLER_AGENT_ID`,
`HANDLER_PROJECT_ID`, `HANDLER_AGENT_NAME`, `HANDLER_AGENT_ROLE`, `DATABASE_URL`), since
hook stdin doesn't carry it; the wiring itself lives in the generated `settings.json`.

## Forge workflow (Phase 2)

Handler doesn't give the operator forge commands. It **configures forge for the agents**
and lets them drive a role-based dev workflow themselves — the operator only sets a
project's `credential_ref` (and optionally a `FORGE_VERSION` pin).

- **Three roles, three agents.** A `junior` agent writes the change and opens a PR; a
  `senior` agent reviews it and records an approval; a `deploy` agent merges and ships it.
  Each is a separate agent with its own tmux session and working dir, so review is a
  genuine second context — not the author signing off on their own work.
- **Skills, committed into the repo.** `handler forge-init` writes role skills
  (`forge-junior`, `forge-senior`, `forge-deploy`, plus an overview) into the managed
  repo's `.claude/skills/` and commits them, so the workflow travels with the code and is
  visible to humans. `forge` itself is already authenticated inside each agent, so it
  works the same across GitHub/GitLab/Gitea/Forgejo/Bitbucket.
- **A hard approval gate.** A merge or deploy command (`forge … merge`, `mise run deploy`)
  — and a direct `git push` to a protected branch (`main`/`master`, see `PROTECTED_BRANCHES`)
  — is *denied* unless a standing `approved` record exists for the current branch, made by
  a **different** agent than the one merging, and still pinned to the reviewed commit
  (pushing new commits invalidates a stale approval). Same block-on-failure mechanism as
  the test and push gates — the senior's `handler approve` is what unlocks it, no agent can
  approve its own branch, and the protected-branch rule closes the "merge locally, push to
  main" path around it.
- **CI follow-through.** When a push clears the local gates, Handler records the commit
  with `ci_status = 'pending'`. The `handler poll-ci` poller then asks `forge ci list` for
  the runs tied to that commit and backfills the authoritative verdict — one interface,
  any forge, no inbound webhook.

### Credentials — resolution over raw storage (README 3.7)

The database never stores a *usable* secret. A project's `credential_ref` is a **pointer**:

| Form | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `env:VAR_NAME` | read the value from an environment variable |
| `file:/path` | read (and strip) the value from a file |
| `cmd:some command` | run the command; its stdout is the value (CLI-only) |
| `db:host:<hostname>` | decrypt the named git server's stored token (`HANDLER_SECRET_KEY`) |

When a project has **no** `credential_ref`, the git server matching its remote supplies
the token automatically (its stored token, decrypted at spawn) — so projects added from a
configured server need zero per-repo credential setup.

At spawn the control layer resolves the token and injects it into that one agent's
environment as `FORGE_TOKEN` (plus the host-specific `GITHUB_TOKEN` / `GITEA_TOKEN` / …
when the remote is recognized). A repo-local git credential helper is installed that
hands the same value back for HTTPS push/pull — so one secret services both `forge` and
`git`, and the raw token lives only in the process environment. For **SSH remotes** the
server's deploy key is materialized to a 0600 file in the control container and pinned
via `GIT_SSH_COMMAND` / repo-local `core.sshCommand`, so agents' pushes over ssh just
work. Tokens and private keys stored in the database are Fernet-encrypted with
`HANDLER_SECRET_KEY`; without the key a database dump holds only ciphertext.

### Scheduled agents

A **schedule** spawns a fresh agent every `interval_seconds`: pick a repository, a name
prefix, a role, and a standing prompt. On each firing the worker enqueues an ordinary
`spawn` command (visible in Activity) with a timestamped agent name, and the repo is
pulled before the run — every run starts stateless from the remote's latest state.
Continuity lives in the repo itself; the canonical prompt is:

> Read @notes.md and continue from where it left off. Before finishing, overwrite
> @notes.md with the current state so the next run can pick up from there.

Missed intervals (worker down) collapse into a single catch-up run. Manage schedules in
the dashboard's **Schedules** pane or via `GET/POST /projects/:p/schedules`,
`PATCH`/`DELETE /schedules/:id`.

## Development

```bash
pytest          # 106 tests, entirely on SQLite — no live claude/tmux/mise/forge/git needed
ruff check .    # lint
# or, via the project's own mise tasks:
mise run verify # lint + test
```

The suite drives every API route through FastAPI's `TestClient`, exercises all four hook
types plus the approval gate, credential resolution, the skills generator, and the CI
poller, and runs a real `alembic upgrade head` per test so the migration path itself is
covered. The seams — `control.tmux`, `control.forge`, `control.gitops`, `hooks.verify`,
and `control.spawn.resume` — are the mock points that stand in for live
`claude`/`tmux`/`mise`/`forge`/`git`, and the drop-in points for wiring them up for real.

### Frontend

The dashboard (`frontend/`) is a **Next.js** app (React + TypeScript) that builds to a
**static export** — the `Claude Activity` Control Center: a left-nav hub over Runs,
Repositories, Agents, Schedules, Approvals, Git Servers, Activity, and Shared. It is a pure client of
the API (same contract as `curl`): the browser prompts for the token once, stores it in
`localStorage`, and attaches it to every call. All API values render as React text
(never `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`) so agent-authored strings can't inject markup.

The build output lands in `src/handler/api/static/`, which FastAPI serves same-origin —
there is no separate frontend server. The export is a **generated artifact and is
gitignored**, not committed: tracked builds guaranteed merge conflicts (Next's
content-hashed chunk names churn on every build) and let the served UI drift from its
source. It gets built in one of two places:

- **Docker** (the normal path): the [`Dockerfile`](Dockerfile)'s `ui` stage runs
  `npm ci && npm run build` and copies the export into the packaged tree, so the image
  published by [`docker.yml`](.github/workflows/docker.yml) always carries a UI built
  from exactly the source in that commit.
- **Source installs**: build it yourself before (or after) `pip install`:

```bash
cd frontend
npm install
npm run build            # static export → frontend/out/
npm run export           # build, then sync frontend/out/ → src/handler/api/static/
```

Without that step a source install still works — the API only mounts `static/` when the
directory exists, so it just runs headless (API-only).

`npm run dev` runs the UI against a live API on another origin — set
`NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8000` and enable `CORS_ORIGINS` on the API.

## Project layout

```
src/handler/
  config.py            # env-driven settings, shared by every entrypoint
  db/                  # SQLAlchemy Core schema, engine, portable types, upsert, DAL
  api/                 # FastAPI app, auth deps, pydantic schemas, routes
  control/             # CLI, tmux/worktree/settings-gen seams, spawn orchestration,
                       # forge/gitops seams, credentials, skills_gen, CI poller
  hooks/               # Stop/SessionEnd, PreToolUse gate (push + approval), Notification
  migrations/          # Alembic env + versions
  api/static/          # built Next.js export (generated + gitignored — see frontend/)
frontend/              # Next.js dashboard source (builds to api/static/)
tests/                 # DB, API, hook, and control tests (SQLite)
docs/PLAN.md           # full design + phased roadmap (the original plan of action)
```

## Roadmap

Phase 1 (the MVP) is the control layer + API. **Phase 2** (forge integration) is
implemented: credential resolution + injection, role-based forge-workflow skills, the hard
approval gate, and the CI-status poller — one interface across GitHub / GitLab / Gitea /
Forgejo / Bitbucket. Still ahead: **Phase 3** a web UI, **Phase 4** optional observability,
and **Phase 5** open-source release. Details and design rationale live in
[`docs/PLAN.md`](docs/PLAN.md).

## Changelog

Release notes — including per-release **deployment/rollout checklists** (migrations,
image changes, new env vars) — live in [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md).

## License

MIT.